The expensive energy revolution in Germany. The implementation of the Energiewende is behind schedule. OSW Commentary No. 77, 2012-05-10 by Kwiatkowska-Drozdz, Anna & Mazur, Konrad
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1	 When	the	amended	
nuclear	energy	act	
came	into	force	
in	June	2011,	
the	decommissio-
ning	of	eight	of	the	
seventeen	reactors	
operating	in	Germany	
began.	The	remaining	
nine	are	to	be	gradua-
lly	decommissioned	
in	2014–2022.
2	 Germany	holds	sixth	
position	in	Europe	
in	terms	of	power	pro-
duction	using	renewa-
ble	sources	of	energy.	
Austria	has	the	largest	
share	(approximately	
70%)	of	power	produ-
ced	from	renewable	
energy	in	Europe.	
The	other	leaders	
are	Sweden	(60%),	
Portugal	(39%),	
Finland	(31%)	and	
Spain	(29%).	Source:	
www.eurostat.com
The expensive energy revolution in Germany 
The implementation of the Energiewende is behind schedule
Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, Konrad Mazur
One year after the events of Fukushima the implementation of the new 
German energy strategy adopted in the summer of 2011 is being verified. 
Business circles, experts and publicists are sounding the alarm. The tempo 
at which the German economy is being rearranged in order that it uses re-
newable energy sources is so that it has turned out to be an extremely dif-
ficult and expensive task. The implementation of the key guidelines of the 
new strategy, such as the development of the transmission networks and 
the construction of new conventional power plants, is meeting increasing 
resistance in the form of economic and legal difficulties. The development 
of the green technologies sector is also posing problems. The solar energy 
industry, for example, is excessively subsidised, whereas the subsidies for 
the construction of maritime wind farms are too low. At present, only those 
guidelines of the strategy which are evaluated as economically feasible 
by investors or which receive adequate financial support from the state 
have a chance of being carried through. The strategy may also turn out 
to be unsuccessful due to the lack of a comprehensive coordination of its 
implementation and the financial burden its introduction entails for both 
the public and the economy. In the immediate future, the German govern-
ment will make efforts not only to revise its internal regulations in order 
to enable the realisation of the energy transformation; it is also likely to 
undertake a number of measures at the EU forum which will facilitate this 
realisation. One should expect that the German government will actively 
support the financing of both the development of the energy networks 
in EU member states and the development of renewable energy sources 
in the energy sector. 
The guidelines of the new German energy strategy…
The	key	guidelines	of	the	new	German	energy	strategy	are:	withdrawal	from	the	use	of	nuc-
lear	energy	by	20221,	a	more	extensive	use	of	renewable	energy	sources	(RES),	the	develop-	
ment	 of	 transmission	 networks,	 the	 construction	 of	 new	 conventional	 power	 plants	 and	
an	improvement	in	energy	efficiency.	This	strategy	is	to	be	based	primarily	on	the	advan-
cement	of	renewable	sources	of	energy.	Pursuant	to	the	amended	RES	Act,	 the	share	of	
renewable	 energy	 in	 power	 production	 is	 to	 gradually	 increase	 from	17%2	 at	 present	 to	
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approximately	 38%	 in	2020.	 This	 share	 is	 to	 reach	 approximately	 50%	 in	2030,	65%	
in	2040	and	as	much	as	80%	in	2050	(see	Appendix).	The	amended	RES	Act	envisages	
higher	 subsidies	 for	maritime	wind	 power	 (offshore	wind	 farms)	 and	 geothermal	 energy	
(heat	pumps),	and	a	reduction	of	the	subsidies	for	solar	power.	A	special	role	has	been	assi-
gned	to	the	development	of	the	German	transmission	networks	in	the	new	energy	strategy.	
The	act	on	their	accelerated	development	(the	construction	period	is	to	be	shortened	from	
ten	to	four	years)	envisages	that	approximately	4,450	km	of	transmission	networks	will	be	
created,	mainly	to	provide	a	connection	between	the	northern	federal	states	(where	the	wind	
farms	will	produce	power)	and	the	south	of	the	country	(which,	being	highly	industrialised,	
will	be	affected	most	of	all	by	the	lack	of	nuclear	power).	The	replacement	of	nuclear	po-
wer	with	renewable	power	is	to	be	accompanied	by	the	construction	of	small,	efficient	and	
modern	conventional	power	plants	as	well	as	energy	storage	facilities.	Support	from	conven-
tional	power	plants	is	necessary,	because	they	ensure	uninterrupted	electricity	supplies	to	
consumers,	which	RES	power	plants	cannot	guarantee	(for	example,	in	windless	weather	
or	when	the	wind	is	too	strong,	wind	farms	do	not	work).	According	to	the	strategy,	10	GW	
of	new	output	is	to	be	ensured	by	2020	at	conventional	power	plants	(using	coal	and	gas).	
…and the difficulties with putting them into practice
The	greatest	difficulties	 in	 the	 implementation	of	 the	 strategy	are	 linked	 to	 the	develop-
ment	of	the	transmission	networks.	Although,	according	to	the	operators	who	manage	the	
networks	in	Germany,	one	third	of	all	the	lines	are	operating	to	capacity3,	only	200	km	of	
the	planned	4,000	km	of	networks	have	been	built	thus	far.	The	reasons	for	the	standstill	
in	this	sector	include	both	banks’	unwillingness	to	give	credit	to	such	ventures	and	the	legal	
problems	related	to	long-lasting	processes	of	expropriation	of	the	land	where	the	networks	
are	to	be	built,	and	public	protests	(the	declared	support	for	Energiewende	is	vast	across	
Germany,	however,	the	well-known	NIMBY	–	Not	In	My	Back	Yard	–	principle	applies	here)4.
As	regards	the	conventional	energy	sector,	
which	 is	 to	 support	 the	 development	 of	
renewable	energy	sources,	 the	main	pro-
blem	 is	 low	 cost-efficiency.	 Neither	 Ger-
man	nor	 foreign	companies	are	willing	to	
invest	 in	 new	 conventional	 power	 plants	
due	 to:	 (a)	 the	 low	cost-efficiency	of	 the	
construction	and	operation	of	gas	and	coal	
power	plants,	given	the	perspective	of	RES	
development	 in	Germany5,	(b)	 the	 low	or	
negative	margins	 on	 sales	 of	 gas	 in	Ger-
many,	(c)	the	high	competitiveness	and	diversification	of	the	conventional	energy	market,	
in	particular	the	gas	market6,	and	(d)	the	adverse	financial	situation	of	German	companies	
(RWE	has	debts	of	27	billion	euros,	and	the	debts	of	E.ON	stand	at	16	billion	euros).	Even	
those	investments	which	are	already	underway	are	at	risk.	It	is	unclear	whether	RWE	and	
E.ON	will	 complete	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 coal	 power	 plants	 in	 the	 Ruhr	Metropolitan	
Region	and	in	the	eastern	federal	states,	and	of	the	small	gas	power	plants	in	the	south	of	
the	country	(see	Appendix).	Even	those	foreign	companies	which	have	access	to	their	own	
raw	materials	are	not	so	eager	to	invest	on	the	German	market	as	had	been	expected7.
Another	problem	is	the	development	of	the	offshore	wind	power	sector,	which	may	be	slo-
wed	down	due	to	difficulties	with	connecting	the	farms	by	submarine	cables	to	the	power	
networks	on	land.	Network	operators	point	out	that	the	technologies	of	laying	the	subma-
rine	cable	and	connections	between	the	wind	turbines	(‘cluster	connections’)	are	new	and	
	
	
	
3	 http://www.focus.de/immobi-
lien/energiesparen/energiever-
sorgung-stromkollaps-mit-an-
sage_aid_712742.html
	
4	 See	above.
	
5	 The	cost-effectiveness	
of	the	use	of	conventional	
power	plants	in	Europe	is	also	
in	doubt	due	to	the	fact	that	
after	2013	energy	companies	
will	have	to	purchase	CO2	
emission	certificates,	the	
prices	of	which	fluctuate	signi-
ficantly	on	financial	markets.
6	 Hundreds	of	firms	engaged	in	
the	production	and	distribution	
of	natural	gas	operate	on	the	
German	market,	as	a	conse-
quence	of	which	this	market	
is	highly	competitive	and	is	
characterised	by	low	margins.	
7	 Russia’s	Gazprom	has	chosen	
not	to	co-operate	with	RWE	
for	the	time	being	due	to	
the	low	cost-efficiency	of	
investments	on	the	German	
gas	market.	RWE	is	holding	
unofficial	talks	regarding	this	
issue	with	another	Russian	
company,	Inter	RAO.
The implementation of the key 
guidelines of the new strategy, such as 
the development of the transmission 
networks and the construction of new 
conventional power plants, is meeting 
increasing resistance in the form 
of economic and legal difficulties. 
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complex	solutions,	which	have	not	been	used	on	a	broad	scale	in	Germany	so	far.	These	
solutions,	if	applied,	will	significantly	lengthen	the	time	of	making	the	connections	to	the	
wind	farms	and	are,	furthermore,	very	expensive8.	The	German	companies	E.ON,	RWE	and	
EnBW	have	threatened	they	will	withhold	their	investments,	unless	offshore	wind	farms	are	
properly	integrated	into	the	network.	
The	solar	power	sector	also	needs	to	deal	with	economic	problems.	The	system	for	subsi-
dising	RES	in	Germany	was	devised	in	such	a	way	that	the	solar	power	sector	received	the	
largest	subsidies9.	These	subsidies	increased	as	new	solar	cells	were	installed,	and	the	costs	
were	transferred	to	the	bills	paid	by	German	consumers	This	system	has	led	not	only	to	an	
excessive	increase	in	the	number	of	companies	operating	in	the	photovoltaics	industry	but	
also	to	overproduction	of	solar	power,	which	cannot	be	sent	anywhere	due	to	the	lack	of	
connections	to	the	network	and	for	which	
subsidies	 are	 due	 anyway.	 Therefore,	
the	 latest	 draft	 amendment	 of	 the	 RES	
Act	of	9	March	2012	provides	for	a	reduc-
tion	 in	subsidies	 for	solar	power	 in	2012	
by	30%.	The	government’s	actions	seem	
reasonable	because	this	sector,	which	pro-
duces	only	3%	of	electricity	 in	Germany,	
used	to	receive	50%	of	all	subsidies	allo-
cated	for	RES.	On	the	other	hand,	further	
cuts	of	subsidies	result	in	financial	losses	
and	 bankruptcies	 of	 German	 firms	 from	
the	solar	energy	sector,	including	companies	from	Thuringia,	Saxony-Anhalt	and	Branden-
burg,	which	are	among	the	driving	forces	which	boost	development	of	the	eastern	federal	
states.	Another	problem	in	the	German	solar	power	industry	is	the	competition	from	Chinese	
manufacturers,	who	offer	much	cheaper	equipment	and	also	benefit	from	the	German	subsi-
dies	system	(50%	of	the	solar	cells	operating	on	the	German	market	originate	from	China).
It	 is	 difficult	 to	 improve	 energy	 efficiency	mainly	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 legal	 regulations.	
No	law	that	would	regulate	this	has	been	included	in	German	legislation	due	to	a	dispute	
taking	place	in	the	country.	This	dispute	is	at	several	levels:	between	the	governing	coalition	
(the	CDU/CSU	and	the	FDP)	and	the	opposition	(the	SPD	and	the	Green	Party),	who	insist	
that	more	expenses	should	be	allocated	for	this	purpose;	between	the	federal	government	
and	 the	governments	of	 individual	 federal	 states	 (over	 the	distribution	of	expenses);	and	
between	Minister	of	Economy	Philipp	Roesler	(FDP)	and	Minister	of	Environment	Norbert	
Roettgen	(CDU),	who	wants	expenditure	on	the	thermal	insulation	of	buildings	to	be	above	
1.5	billion	euros10.	The	two	ministers	recently	reached	a	compromise	on	the	German	go-
vernment’s	common	stance	on	improving	energy	efficiency	in	the	EU.	The	government	is	
planning	to	put	forward	its	proposal	for	an	EU	directive	concerning	energy	efficiency	(binding	
upon	all	EU	member	states),	which	offers	the	freedom	of	choice	only	in	one	issue:	whether	
the	growth	in	energy	efficiency	should	be	1.5%	or	2.1%	annually.
The government is saving its own strategy
To	carry	through	the	energy	strategy,	the	German	government	will	need	to	introduce	a	num-
ber	of	legal	changes,	i.e.	to	take	care	of	the	complete	implementation	of	the	laws	on	which	
the	energy	transformation	is	based,	to	implement	comprehensive	management	of	the	project	
and	to	offer	economic	incentives	to	investors.
Two	 laws	 from	 the	package	 of	 the	 legal	 acts	 accompanying	 the	Energiewende have	not	
yet	been	adopted	in	the	Bundestag	–	the	act	on	the	improvement	of	energy	efficiency	and	
8	 EnBW	is	building	the	first	of-
fshore	wind	farms	in	the	Baltic	
Sea:	Baltic	1	and	2,	while	
RWE	and	E.ON	are	building	
offshore	wind	farms	in	the	
North	Sea	next	to	the	island	
of	Heligoland.	
9	 The	solar	energy	sector	rece-
ived	approximately	7	billion	
euros	of	subsidies	in	2011	
(calculations	on	the	basis	
of	data	from	the	Federal	
Statistical	Office).
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
10	 40%	of	the	energy	
is	consumed	by	the	housing	
sector.	If	buildings	and	heating	
technologies	were	modernised,	
energy	consumption	could	
decrease	significantly.	
The	act	allocates	
1.5	billion	euros	annually	
for	this	purpose.
To carry through the energy strategy, 
the German government will need 
to introduce a number of legal chan-
ges, i.e. to take care of the complete 
implementation of the laws on which 
the energy transformation is based, 
to implement comprehensive manage-
ment of the project and to offer 
economic incentives to investors.
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the	 act	 on	 underground	 storage	 of	 CO2,	 ‘the	 CCS	 (Carbon	 Capture	 and	 Storage)	 Act’
11.	
The	former	is	likely	to	be	adopted,	while	the	latter	has	no	chance	of	being	supported	in	the	
Bundesrat	due	 to	 resistance	 from	the	 federal	states.	The	other	acts	 in	 the	governmental	
package	must	be	supplemented	to	include	incentives	for	investments	and	fiscal	facilitations	
for	those	who	invest	in	the	development	of	the	networks,	provisions	that	would	shorten	the	
construction	permit	wait	time	and	those	that	would	accelerate	the	expropriation	process.	
At	present,	there	is	no	central	agency	in	charge	of	the	management	of	the	new	strategy	that	
would	coordinate	all	activities	and	the	public	dialogue,	and	which	would	also	work	on	a	com-
promise	between	the	central	government	and	the	governments	of	individual	federal	states.	
Too	many	entities	are	responsible	for	the	German	energy	transformation.	Its	coordination	is	among	
the	prerogatives	of	both	Minister	of	Economy	Philipp	Roesler	(FDP)	and	Minister	of	Environment	
Norbert	Roettgen	(CDU),	who	are	at	the	same	time	the	main	opponents	to	each	other.	Some	de-
cisions	concerning	Energiewende are	also	to	be	taken	partly	by	the	minister	of	science	(research	in	
the	RES	sector	in	the	broader	meaning	of	the	term),	the	minister	of	infrastructure	(modernisation	
of	buildings)	and	the	minister	of	finance.	Experts	suggest	a	position	of	a	government	commissio-
ner	for	the	energy	transformation	or	a	special	ministry	for	energy	should	be	created.	An	alternative	
suggestion	is	that	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel	
should	 directly	 take	 over	 the	 supervision	
of	the	implementation	of	this	strategy.	
Energiewende would	 be	 much	 easier	 to	
implement,	 if	 Germany’s	 largest	 energy	
companies	 became	 engaged	 in	 it.	 Only	
two	months	 following	the	presentation	of	
the	 new	 strategy,	 the	 companies	 opera-
ting	on	the	German	market	(E.ON,	RWE,	
EnBW	and	Vattenfall)	noticed	the	opportu-
nities	to	derive	profits	in	this	sector	and	announced	modification	of	their	policies.	It	includes	
debt	reduction	(through	the	sale	of	assets	in	the	sectors	where	low	profits	are	forecast)	in	or-
der	to	increase	their	investment	capital	to	be	allocated	for	the	development	of	the	renewable	
energy	sector	(EnBW	allocated	10	billion	euros	for	investments	in	RES	by	2020,	while	RWE	
will	spend	5	billion	euros	by	2015).	The	senior	executives	of	these	companies	are	unwilling	
to	invest	in	the	construction	of	new	blocks	in	conventional	power	plants	and	network	deve-
lopment	mainly	because	doing	business	in	these	sectors	is	unprofitable.
The	implementation	of	the	new	energy	strategy	will	affect	the	economy	and	raise	the	cost	of	
energy	supplied	to	German	consumers.	Subsidies	allocated	for	RES	in	2011	reached	13	bil-
lion	euros.	The	costs	of	the	development	of	the	renewable	energy	sector	and	the	transmission	
networks	will	be	incurred	by	everyone:	from	representatives	of	heavy	industry	to	individual	
electricity	users.	The	operators	of	Germany’s	four	largest	transmission	networks	(50	Hertz,	
Amprion,	EnBW	Transportnetze	and	TenneT12)	have	published	a	medium-term	forecast	con-
cerning	the	development	of	renewable	energy	sources	(RES)	in	Germany.	According	to	their	
data,	the	development	of	the	RES	sector	may	lead	to	an	increase	in	electricity	prices	by	as	
much	as	30%	until	2013,	which	in	turn	will	cause	higher	inflation	and	food	prices.	The	electri-
city	charges	include	a	tax	on	the	development	of	renewable	energy,	which	is	increasing	as	the	
RES	are	developing,	and	–	in	the	opinion	of	the	Federation	of	German	Consumer	Organisations	
–	is	to	reach	4.5	cents/kWh	next	year,	although	the	government	has	promised	it	will	nor	be	
higher	than	3.5	cents/kWh.	It	will	still	take	a	long	time	before	the	total	costs	of	the	implemen-
tation	of	the	new	energy	strategy	can	be	precisely	assessed.	Reports	from	various	research	
centres	and	economists	present	very	different	estimates,	ranging	from	20	billion	to	300	billion	
euros	 to	2020	 (without	considering	 the	costs	of	decommissioning	and	 the	disassembly	of	
the	nuclear	power	plants	and	of	increasing	electricity	prices).
11	 The	CCS	Act	envisages	
the	use	of	clean	coal	technolo-
gies,	which	could	provide	
an	alternative	to	RES	technolo-
gies.	Due	to	fears	of	ecological	
threats,	local	communities	
do	not	wish	even	CCS	pilot	
projects	to	be	implemented.
12	Transmission	networks	are	
built	by	the	network	operators:	
TenneT	in	the	northern	
and	southern	federal	states	
(this	is	a	Dutch	company,	
100%	state-owned);	Amprion	
in	the	western	federal	states	
(a	large	stake	of	it	is	controlled	
by	financial	institutions	from	
Switzerland	and	Germany)	
and	50	Hertz	in	the	eastern	
federal	states	(a	greater	part	
of	it	is	owned	by	the	Belgian	
network	operator,	Elia).
It will still take a long time before 
the total costs of the implementation 
of the new energy strategy can be preci-
sely assessed. Reports from various re-
search centres and economists present 
very different estimates, ranging from 
20 billion to 300 billion euros to 2020.
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Conclusion
The energy transformation in Germany is not perceived as an element of protection of 
the natural environment but primarily as part of the state’s economic and social policy. 
The	importance	this	project	has	for	the	German	government	can	be	seen	in	the	terminology	
used	by	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel	and	 the	ministers	of	economy	and	environment	when	
referring	to	this	change.	It	is	described	as	a	“great	chance	for	Germany”13,	a	project	compa-
rable	to	a	new	unification	of	Germany14	or	a	“task	for	the	nation”	in	which	all	Germans	need	
to	participate15.	Such	strong	engagement	from	politicians	and	the	activity	of	an	exceptionally	
strong	 lobby	supporting	green	 technologies	are	 turning	 the	energy	 transformation	 into	an	
ideological	issue.	Thus	a	new	‘taboo	topic	in	German	politics’16	is	being	created,	which	does	
not	allow	a	cool-headed	analysis	to	be	made	of	the	costs	or	an	evaluation	of	the	schedule	
of	introducing	the	changes	in	the	German	energy	system.
Energiewende as a ‘new social deal’ is to consolidate German society using this as a pivo-
tal idea, to bring sense to this policy, but first of all to become a catalyst and stimulus for 
innovation, technological development and a new driving force of the German economy. 
Germany	is	already	one	of	the	largest	manufacturers	and	exporters	of	green	technologies17.	
Energiewende is	 also	 presented	 as	 an	 antidote	 to	 dependence	 on	 imports	 of	 raw	mate-
rials,	a	chance	for	maintaining	a	high	position	in	international	trade18	and	a	way	to	escape	
the	consequences	of	‘peak	oil’19.
These goals would be much easier to achieve, if Germany adopted an evolutionary ap-
proach to replacing its nuclear and conventional power plants with those based on re-
newable energy sources. The	sudden	resignation	from	the	support	offered	by	the	nuclear	
power	plants	and	 the	absence	of	a	coordination	of	activity	as	part	of	Energiewende	has	
brought	 about	 great	 dissatisfaction	 in	
business	 circles,	 anxiety	 among	 experts	
and	alarmist	reports	from	the	media.	The	
stock	 exchange	 index	 where	 thirty	 com-
panies	from	the	green	technologies	sector	
are	listed	has	fallen	by	approximately	60%	
since	 April	 201120.	 The	 share	 prices	 of	
the	 largest	 energy	 companies	 (which	are	
to	take	part	 in	the	implementation	of	the	
new	energy	strategy	along	with	the	sector	
of	 small	 and	 medium-sized	 companies),	
especially	of	E.ON	and	RWE,	dropped	im-
mediately	after	the	German	government’s	
decision	 to	phase	out	 the	nuclear	energy	
sector	was	announced.	According	to	fore-
casts,	 the	combined	debt	of	 the	 four	 largest	energy	companies	 (RWE,	E.ON,	EnBW	and	
Vattenfall)	may	increase	by	approximately	20	billion	euros21.	In	turn,	German	experts	are	
warning	of	 the	growing	 threat	of	dependence	on	Russian	gas22	and	also	on	neodymium,	
an	element	necessary	for	the	production	of	modern	wind	turbines,	which	is	imported	from	
China23.	Furthermore,	the	government	of	Bavaria	has	threatened	it	will	not	participate	in	the	
Energiewende	project,	unless	it	receives	special	support,	including	financially24.	Incidentally,	
the	Bavarian	government’s	attitude	to	the	development	of	the	Czech	nuclear	power	plant	
in	Temelin	can	be	described	as	at	least	neutral,	if	not	positive25.
In addition to streamlining the decision-making processes and the implementation of 
the next stages of the energy transformation in Germany, the chances of success for 
13	http://www.tagesschau.de/
inland/atomausstieg176.html
14	 http://videokatalog.handel-
sblatt.com/Politik/Ressorts/
Wirtschaftspolitik/video-
-R%C3%B6sler-Die-Ener-
giewende-ist-so-schwierig-wie-
-die-Wiedervereinigung-Intervi
ew-144918.html
15	 http://www.faz.net/aktuell/
wirtschaft/energiepolitik-der-
-masterplan-fuer-die-deutsche-
-energiewende-11558633.html
16	 http://www.euractiv.de/ener-
gie-und-klimaschutz/artikel/
wie-sinnvoll-ist-die-gruene-
-umweltpolitik-005995
17	 http://www.faz.net/aktuell/
wirtschaft/energiepolitik-der-
-masterplan-fuer-die-deutsche-
-energiewende-11558633.html
18	According	to	analyses	
of	the	German	Ministry	for	
the	Protection	of	the	Natural	
Environment,	sales	of	green	
technologies	in	2020	would	
reach	a	level	equivalent	
to	the	total	sales	of	the	car	
and	machine	industries,	
the	sectors	which	have	been	
playing	the	most	important	
role	in	German	exports	so	far.
19	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/osw-commenta-
ry/2011-02-08/natural-resour-
ces-deficit-implications-ger-
man-politics
20	http://www.onvista.de/index/
snapshot.html?ID_NOTATIO-
N=17959531&MONTH-
S=12#chart
21	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/osw-commen-
tary/2011-10-24/german-
companies-strengthen-their-
cooperation-russian-gas-suppl
22	http://www.swp-berlin.org/
de/publikationen/kurz-gesagt/
energiewende-und-gas.html
23	http://daserste.ndr.de/pa-
norama/archiv/2011/wind-
kraft189.html
24	http://www.verivox.de/
nachrichten/energiewende-
-bayern-droht-bund-mit-son-
derweg-83695.aspx
25	http://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/cewe-
ekly/2011-12-01/warmer-
-czechbavarian-relations
Such strong engagement from politi-
cians and the activity of an exceptio-
nally strong lobby supporting green 
technologies are turning the energy 
transformation into an ideological issue. 
Thus a new ‘taboo topic in German 
politics’  is being created, which does 
not allow a cool-headed analysis to 
be made of the costs or an evaluation 
of the schedule of introducing the 
changes in the German energy system.
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26	http://www.swp-berlin.org/
fileadmin/contents/products/
aktuell/2012A08_fis_gdn.pdf;	
http://www.swp-berlin.org/file-
admin/contents/products/aktu-
ell/2011A47_fis_gdn_ks.pdf
27	http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexU-
riServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CO-
M:2011:0658:FIN:PL:PDF
28	 MPs	from	the	SPD	have	repro-
ached	the	EU	Commissioner	
for	Energy,	Guenther	Oettinger,	
for	the	fact	that	the	plans	for	the	
development	of	the	energy	sector	
in	the	EU	presented	by	the	Europe-
an	Commission	in	the	Road	Map	
2050	insufficiently	emphasise	the	
role	of	RES.	The	Social	Democrats	
insist	that	energy	systems	in	the	
EU	should	be	based	on	RES	and	
energy	efficiency,	and	that	nuclear	
and	coal	power	plants	should	
be	totally	eliminated	in	the	EU.	
http://www.euractiv.de/
energie-und-klimaschutz/
artikel/friedrich-kommission-
unterschatzt-potenzial-
der-erneuerbaren-
energien-005889
29	http://www.handelsblatt.com/
politik/international/klima-
politik-eu-parlament-fordert-
-eingriffe-in-den-emissionshan-
del/6332184.html
30	On	15	March,	members	
of	the	SPD	submitted	a	motion	
at	the	Bundestag	with	demands	
to	amend	the	Euratom	treaty:	
“The	Treaty	establishing	the	
European	Atomic	Energy	
Community	(Euratom)	should	be	
adjusted	to	the	future	challenges.	
The	federal	government	should	
take	action	to	cause	that	
an	intergovernmental	conference	
is	convened	as	soon	as	possible	
in	order	to	amend	the	treaty	
substantially.	The	special	position	
of	the	nuclear	power	sector	should	
be	withdrawn	on	that	occasion.	
The	funds	which	become	available	
as	a	consequence	of	this	should	be	
invested	in	scientific	research	and	
development	of	the	energy	sector	
based	on	renewable	sources	outsi-
de	the	framework	of	the	treaty.”
31	 A	statement	from	spokesmen	for	
the	parliamentary	groups	dealing	
with	economic	issues	representing	
the	CDU/CSU	and	the	FDP.	
The	EU	Commissioner	for	Energy,	
Guenther	Oettinger,	said	after	
the	decision	made	by	the	German	
government	that	natural	gas	
would	be	the	main	driving	force	
for	growth:	“more	renewable	
sources	also	means	more	gas.”
Energiewende can be improved by shifting the problem to the EU level. This has been 
admitted by German experts: “if energy transformation in Germany is to be successful, 
it must be backed up with political initiatives at the EU level”26.	Therefore,	it	may	be	ex-
pected	that	representatives	of	the	German	government	will	take	measures	to	push	through	
or	back	initiatives	in	the	following	areas:	(a)	supporting	the	development	and	coordination	
of	 networks,	 both	 German	 and	 cross-border,	 including	 financing	 them	 from	 EU	 sources	
(the	proposed	sum	is	9.1	billion	euros	for	2014–2020	as	part	of	TEN-E27);	(b)	propagat-
ing	 the	 German	 model	 of	 energy	 trans-
formation	in	Europe	in	order	to	boost	the	
demand	 for,	 and	 thus	 cost-effectiveness	
of,	 green	 technologies;	 (c)	 including	 the	
mechanisms	for	supporting	green	technol-
ogies	at	the	EU	level28	(including	increasing	
the	spending	from	the	EU	budget	on	green	
technologies,	which	will	 offer	Germany	–	
the	leading	exporter	of	these	technologies	–	
significant	revenues,	thus	reducing	the	nega-
tive	net	balance;	(d)	 imposing	a	stricter	carbon	emission	reduction	level	 in	the	EU	reduction	
target29;	(e)	imposing	stricter	safety	criteria	regarding	nuclear	power	plants	in	the	EU	upon	all	
the	member	states30;	and	(f)	softening	the	provisions	of	the	EU	Third	Energy	Package	to	the	
benefit	of	the	Russian	monopoly,	Gazprom,	because	“without	nuclear	power,	Germany	will	
be	even	more	interested	in	Russian	gas	supplies	in	the	future”31.	German	experts	claim	that	
energy	policy	determined	by	national	states	is	a	relic	and	neither	guarantees	energy	security	
to	the	EU	nor	reduces	carbon	emissions,	and	it	must	therefore	be	regulated	at	the	EU	level.
The chances of success for Energie-
wende can be improved by shifting 
the problem to the EU level. This has 
been admitted by German experts: 
“if energy transformation in Germany is 
to be successful, it must be backed up 
with political initiatives at the EU level”.
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1. Planned conventional power plants in Germany 
APPEND ICES
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Sources: The German Ministry for the Economy; the German Association of Energy and Water Industries
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2. The structure of power production from renewable energy sources 
in Germany in 2009 and a production forecast for 2020
Source: the German Ministry for the Natural Environment
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